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The main macroeconomic challenges at the early stages of Vietnam’s economic reforms were 
related to stability and growth. The main achievements of Doi Moi are also related to the 
success in meeting these two challenges: Vietnam has managed to combine high growth with 
reasonable price stability since the early 1990s. However, meeting these challenges has 
become more difficult over time as new challenges have emerged. In the mid-1990s, 
economic structure and external balance entered the policy debate. In the late 1990s, the 
Asian crisis created further problems. In recent years, issues related to social and regional 
development gaps and investment quality have become important policy objectives. At the 
same time, it is clear that the instruments for economic policy making have changed. While 
the challenges of the early 1990s could be handled with various direct interventions like credit 
ceilings and quantitative trade restrictions, indirect instruments for macroeconomic 
management are gradually becoming more important. For instance, the choice of exchange 
rate regime is becoming much more important than in the past. This paper summarizes 
Vietnam’s macroeconomic development, and illustrates some of the alternative approaches to 
macroeconomic management in an increasingly internationalized and deregulated 
environment by recounting some experiences from Swedish macroeconomic management 
during the past three decades. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Some of the most impressive achievements during the first two decades of Doi Moi have 
arguably been related to macroeconomic management. Although the challenges facing the 
Vietnamese economy have varied over time, and although the past decades have included 
severe external shocks – for instance, the Asian financial crisis – it has been possible to 
combine high growth with reasonable macroeconomic stability. At the earliest stages of the 
reform process, stability was arguably the main policy goals: the economic reform program 
that was introduced at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 was directly motivated by the severe 
inflation that paralyzed the Vietnamese economy. By the early 1990s, when inflation had been 
brought down to an acceptable level, the policy focus shifted to achieving a high rate of 
economic growth. This was necessary not only to improve the standard of living and sustain 
the public sector, but also to justify one-party rule in an international context where many 
other former command economies underwent both economic and political reforms. The public 
legitimacy of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) was (and continues to be) to some 
extent related to its ability to provide satisfactory results in terms of growth, poverty 
reduction, and convergence towards the income and development levels of the richer East 
Asian economies.  
 
Price stability and growth – with some bias towards growth – have remained priority 
objectives since then, but other policy challenges have been added over time. In the mid-
1990s, industrial structure and external balance emerged as causes of concern. Industrial 
development was largely based on import-substitution through state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), although future reductions in import barriers seemed unavoidable. The question was 
whether the current account deficits generated during this period were sustainable – apart 
from the possible efficiency problems related to heavy investments in SOEs, it was also 
known that the trade regime would have to be liberalized following Vietnam’s accession to 
ASEAN and the application for WTO membership in 1995. Questions related to the 
macroeconomic effects of internationalization attracted even more attention a couple of years 
later, when the Asian crisis demonstrated some of the risks connected to international capital 
flows. By the end of the 1990s, employment generation was recognized as yet another major 
challenge. With over one million new entrants to the labor market every year and an SOE 
sector that had not created any new jobs since the early 1990s, it was necessary to establish 
other sources of employment. The answer was a recognition of the central role of the private 
sector, expressed e.g. in the form of the new Enterprise Law that came into force in 2000. 
During the last few years, social and regional development gaps have also been identified as 
important problems that need to be taken into account in the formulation of development 
strategies and policies.  
 
One way to summarize this development is to note that the challenges facing the Vietnamese 
economy have become increasingly complex and sophisticated over time, and in many ways 
similar to those in much more developed countries. In today’s rapidly globalizing 
environment, macroeconomic management aims to achieve internal as well as external 
balance – essentially, stable prices and exchange rates – at a level of growth that is 
sufficiently high to meet the specific political requirements of the economy in question. In 
Sweden, these political requirements are related to maintaining the welfare state and keeping 
the rate of unemployment low. In Vietnam, growth must be high enough to facilitate 
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population to improve their welfare and standard of living.  
 
However, Vietnam differs from more developed economies when it comes to the instruments 
available for macroeconomic management. At the early stages of Doi Moi, Vietnamese 
authorities could rely on a multitude of tools and policies to reach their objectives, including 
radical interventions like import bans and other discretionary trade restrictions, direct price 
controls, and administrative orders to state-owned enterprises and banks. The scope for direct 
intervention has diminished as a result of domestic reforms and international agreements, but 
the system of indirect policy instruments is still weakly developed. For instance, Vietnamese 
monetary policy relies largely on changes in reserve requirements and discount rates, while 
the possibilities to engage in open market operations are very limited. Hence, while the 
macroeconomic challenges facing Vietnam have become more complex, the government’s 
ability to control and direct the economy has evidently become weaker.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to review some of Vietnam’s experiences regarding 
macroeconomic management and to discuss the challenges that lie ahead. The next section 
will provide a summary of the main stages of macroeconomic development since the mid-
1980s, with some focus on how Vietnam responded to the main problems emerging in the 
course of transition and development. Section 3 will turn to a discussion of the current 
situation and the requirements for the future. While it is impossible to predict in detail what 
kinds of problems Vietnam is likely to face during the coming decades, much can be gleaned 
from the experiences of other countries. Section 4 will therefore summarize some elements of 
Swedish macroeconomic development during the past decades, when the country 
experimented with several different policy regimes in an attempt to adjust to an increasingly 
competitive and internationalized environment: Vietnam is likely to go though some of the 
same stages of development. Section 5 summarizes and provides some concluding comments.  
 
2. Macroeconomic developments since 1986 
 
The shift from the war economy to peacetime production after the unification of North and 
South Vietnam in 1975 was not any great success. The Vietnamese economy suffered from 
the standard incentive and information problems connected to central planning, and industrial 
production stagnated in spite of a heavy investment emphasis on industrial development. 
Moreover, the collectivization of the southern half of the country was problematic: the most 
serious consequence was a fall in food production that forced the country to import large 
amounts of rice. After the involvement in the Cambodian conflict in 1978, Vietnam also lost 
most of the Western development aid that had started flowing in after the end of the war. 
Instead, the economy became heavily dependent on the trade and aid relations with the Soviet 
Union.  
 
By the early 1980s, Vietnam had introduced several reforms that aimed to “perfect” the 
centrally planned economy. In the agricultural sector, many farmers had spontaneously left 
the collectives and returned to household production. These households were allowed to sell 
part of their output – above and beyond what the collective required – in the parallel markets, 
at market prices. Simultaneously, official prices were adjusted upwards, to provide stronger 
incentives for production. In industry, a “three-plan” system was introduced to strengthen the 
incentives for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The first “plan” covered production for the 
state at pre-determined prices using inputs supplied by the state. Under the second plan, 
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using any inputs they could source outside the formal plans. The third plan, finally, allowed 
enterprises to produce and sell additional unplanned output at market prices (Leung and Vo 
Tri Thanh 1996). The supply response was initially positive, but the gains were only 
temporary. One reason was an increase in inflation, which quickly eroded the initial 
improvements in the farmers’ terms-of-trade. Another reason was the response from the 
central planners. When it was obvious that farm households and SOEs had the capacity to 
produce more, they aimed to raise the plan targets in order to appropriate a larger share of the 
production surplus – however, this reduced the autonomy of farms and SOEs, and weakened 
their production incentives. Although these early reforms were not sufficient to reverse the 
decline of central planning, they were important because they introduced an awareness of 
markets even in an overall context of central planning (Fforde 2005). The market experiments 
helped farmers and SOEs react positively to the new opportunities that opened up some years 
later, when more fundamental reforms marked the beginning of the transition from central 
planning towards a market economy. 
 
2.1 Growth and stabilization 
The decisive steps in the move away from central planning were taken in the mid-1980s, with 
the reform package that became known as doi moi at the Sixth Party Congress of the VCP in 
late 1986. By the time the Congress announced that a multi-sector economy with 
decentralized decision-making, markets, and prices would replace the central plan, several 
important reforms had already been implemented. For instance, the state subsidies for 
consumption goods had been abolished and SOEs had been given the right to set most of their 
prices. They were also permitted to finance their investment and working capital needs by 
borrowing from the State Bank instead of relying on support from the state budget. Nominal 
real wages and pensions had been raised, to compensate for the increases in consumer goods 
prices. A monetary reform – exchanging one new Dong for ten old ones – was also 
implemented to stabilize the economy and absorb the excess liquidity that had accumulated in 
the parallel markets. However, this stabilization effort was largely a failure. Private holders of 
currency managed to shift into gold and foreign exchange, and the main impact of the reform 
was instead to wipe out the currency holdings of SOEs, which were essential to purchase 
inputs from the parallel markets (Leung and Vo Tri Thanh 1996). As a result, many SOEs 
required subsidies to compensate for the losses caused by the currency reform. Other types of 
government expenditures were also high, and the government budget deficit reached 12 
percent of GDP in 1985. This was financed mainly with loans from the central bank. The rate 
of domestic credit expansion reached 300 percent in 1985 and 430 percent in 1986. High 
inflation could not be avoided. Official prices increased by more than 400 percent in 1986; the 
rate of increase in free market prices was nearly 600 percent the same year (Leung and Vo Tri 
Thanh 1996). The inflation rate remained above 300 percent in 1987 and 1988, with severe 
negative effects on economic activity, particularly in the agricultural sector.  
 
Overall growth in 1987 and 1988 was still positive, in spite of the high inflation: the 
increasing autonomy of state enterprises in combination with continued aid inflows from the 
Soviet Union was sufficient to generate GDP growth rates reaching 6 percent in 1988. 
However, when it became evident in early 1989 that the Soviet Union was close to a collapse 
and the flow of Soviet aid would end, Vietnam was forced to deepen its reform program. The 
main macroeconomic problem since the announcement of doi moi had clearly been the high 
rate of inflation, so stabilization became the primary objective of the 1989 reforms. Three 
important measures formed the core of the program. Firstly, real interest rates were raised to 
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rates were set administratively. In early 1989, when the monthly inflation rate was about 6 
percent, the corresponding bank interest rate was set at 12 percent. This led to a rapid increase 
in bank deposits, particularly in the private sector: the households’ holdings of bank deposits 
grew by over 600 percent between March and December the same year (Montes 1995). At the 
same time, credit expansion was kept low: apart from the high nominal interest rates, the State 
Bank imposed strict credit ceilings. Inflation expectations diminished rapidly, and the 
monthly inflation rate dropped below 3 percent by the end of the year. Interest rates fell as 
well, but much more slowly. Secondly, the government budget deficit was reduced. Public 
investment expenditures were held back. Schools and hospitals were allowed to charge formal 
user fees to compensate for lower contributions from the state budget (see Kokko and 
Tingvall 2007). More than 500,000 soldiers were released from the military, reducing public 
expenditures notably. Thirdly, harder budget constraints were imposed on SOEs. Direct 
budget support was abolished and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance ended the provision of 
imported inputs at artificially low prices. By 1992, the provision of subsidized credit to SOEs 
through the banking system was also halted. As a result, some 800,000 workers were laid off 
from state enterprises between 1989 and 1992 (Dollar 1994). By that time, the state budget 
deficit had been reduced to less than 4 percent of GDP, from over 11 percent in 1989. The 
inflation rate was gradually brought down to manageable levels after 1992. 
 
Simultaneously, strong measures were implemented to promote economic growth. Most 
importantly, the agricultural collectives were largely abolished and production decisions were 
moved to the level of the individual household or family farm. The households’ land holdings 
were protected with long-term user rights. The remaining price controls were abolished and 
SOEs were given full nominal autonomy for investment, production, and pricing decisions. 
The exchange rate was unified and the VND was sharply devalued. Trade restrictions were 
eased and the rules for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) were liberalized. The 
combination of these deregulations and the macroeconomic stabilization generated a strong 
positive output response. Although industrial output contracted in 1989 because of the SOEs’ 
harder budget constraints, agriculture and services grew rapidly, resulting in an overall GDP 
growth rate of 8 percent that year. The turnaround in the agricultural sector was particularly 
notable: Vietnam transformed from a heavy importer of rice in the mid-1980s to one of the 
world’s largest rice exporters half a decade later.  
 
By 1991, when the strict credit restrictions introduced as part of the stabilization package had 
been eased, the SOE sector had also recovered and was rapidly moving to take advantage of 
the new opportunities that had opened up as a result of the liberalization and increasing 
openness of the Vietnamese economy. Although the SOE sector was helped by contacts with 
foreign investors and the emergence of Vietnam as a notable oil producer, there is no doubt 
that state enterprises had largely managed to “commercialize” their operations. To some 
extent, this was related to the experiments undertaken since the early 1980s. Another 
explanation was the relative fragmentation of the Vietnamese SOE sector. There were few 
large SOEs owned and controlled by an anonymous “state”: instead, most SOEs had an 
identifiable owner within the state who had some influence over management and an interest 
in the profits generated by the enterprise. In this sense, many SOEs were a type of hybrid 
firms where the distinction between public and private was not always entirely clear. In any 
case, by 1992 Vietnam had established a growth standard of 7-8 percent per year, which was 
sufficient not only to achieve some convergence to the level of the richer regional neighbors, 
but also enough to improve the living standard of most population groups. It was also high 
enough to allow the government to raise the investments in social sectors like health and 
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1980s. Table 1 illustrates the transition resulting from the reform program, and shows how 
Vietnam has been able to maintain a reasonable balance between growth and price stability 
since the early 1990s – the only notable dents in the growth trend were seen in 1998 and 1999, 
when the fallout from the Asian crisis led to somewhat lower growth rates also in Vietnam. 
 
Table 1.  Growth and Inflation in Vietnam 1986-2005 (percent). 
 
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
GDP  growth 2.8 3.6 6.0 4.7 5.1 5.8 8.7 8.1 8.8 9.5 
Inflation  rate* 398  362  407  74.0 42.1 72.8 32.6 17.1 17.0 8.7 
            
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP  growth 9.3 8.2 5.8 4.8 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.8 8.4 
Inflation  rate*  5.7 3.2 7.3 4.1 -1.7  -0.4  3.8 3.1 7.8 8.2 
Sources: East Asian Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2006, Chapter 12. 
Note: * The inflation rate for 1986-1995 refers to the change in the GDP deflator. For 1996-
2005, it is the change in the consumer price index.   
 
The 1989 reforms also had a political dimension. This did not entail much domestic political 
liberalization, but rather a normalization of Vietnam’s external relations. An important step in 
this process was the withdrawal of troops from Cambodia in 1989, which facilitated the 
rebuilding of relations with China, ASEAN, and many Western countries. The normalization 
process was not only politically important, but also of great economic value. Apart from the 
increase in inflows of development assistance, it contributed to the increase in FDI inflows 
that had slowly started growing after 1989.  
 
2.2 Economic structure and external balance 
By the mid-1990s, Vietnam had emerged as one of the most promising markets and 
investment locations in East Asia. The macroeconomic stabilization and gradual shift towards 
a market oriented economy had led to dramatic improvements in the Vietnamese economy 
and triggered a growth boom. The GDP growth rate averaged almost 8 percent per year 
during the period 1990-1995, with over 9 percent recorded in 1995. Domestic savings and 
investment increased, both in absolute amounts and as shares of GDP. International trade 
expanded, with rapid growth in exports as well as imports. Foreign direct investment emerged 
as an important source of capital and technology, with the inflow of FDI reaching USD 2.3 
billion in 1995 (corresponding to 11 percent of GDP, more than anywhere else in the region).  
 
Moreover, Vietnam’s integration into the world economy had deepened. Several bilateral 
trade agreements with foreign countries were established, the US embargo was lifted in early 
1994, Vietnam submitted an application for WTO membership in January 1995 (only days 
after the formal inauguration of the organization) and joined the ASEAN in July 1995. As part 
of the membership in ASEAN, Vietnam also joined AFTA, ASEAN’s free trade agreement, 
and promised to reduce tariffs on intra-regional trade to below 5 percent by 2006. Vietnam’s 
relations with multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund were also normalized, and by 1995, 
Vietnam held structural adjustment credits from the World Bank and the IMF. These credits 
were important not only because they provided financial resources for development, but 
perhaps mainly because they signaled that Vietnam’s economic development was progressing 
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condition that the recipient country pursued ”appropriate” policies in the area of structural 
reform and fiscal and monetary management. Another consequence of the strength of the 
reform process was that the Vietnamese authorities revised their economic targets for the ten-
year plan period 1991-2000. Instead of aiming for a doubling of the country’s GDP over this 
period, as was originally intended in the ten-year plan adopted at the Seventh Party Congress 
in 1991, the target was changed to a doubling of GDP per capita (SRV 1994). Assessing the 
achievements of doi moi, many foreign observers concurred, concluding, for example, that 
“Vietnam appears well-positioned to become a new East Asian ‘dragon’” (Irvin 1995:725).  
 
However, these impressive achievements could not completely hide the fact that the economy 
was burdened by some structural and systemic weaknesses. In particular, donors and foreign 
observers had called attention to several problems related to the import substituting trade 
regime and the continuing reliance on state-owned enterprises as the main vehicle of 
development (Kokko and Zejan 1996, Ljunggren 1996, Mallon 1996, UNDP 1996). 
Regarding trade policy, the concerns focused on the distorted incentives provided by the 
complex, non-transparent, and highly restrictive trade regime (Kokko 1997). Various import 
barriers created strong incentives in favor of import-substitution in consumer goods and 
selected heavy industries, as well as a bias against export-oriented production (not least 
because the interventions tended to overvalue the exchange rate). One paradoxical result was 
that imports were increasing faster than exports: import-substituting industry in Vietnam, as 
elsewhere, was heavily dependent on imported machinery, raw materials, and intermediates. 
Consequently, the trade and current account deficits were widening. In 1995, the current 
account deficit exceeded USD 2.6 billion, or 13 percent of GDP. The large imbalances raised 
questions about Vietnam’s ability to finance the large deficits without endangering 
macroeconomic stability, as well as doubts about how the far-reaching commitments to 
liberalize trade would be realized. In particular, there were fears that the plans to reform the 
trade regime and the production structure might be neutralized by the emergence of strong 
interest groups benefiting from, and therefore lobbying for, continued protectionism. 
 
These questions were intimately related to concerns about the role of state-owned enterprises. 
They were the main beneficiaries of Vietnamese import substitution, in many cases in joint 
ventures with foreign investors. Although the foreign joint venture partners provided badly 
needed technology and skills, it was clear that most SOEs operated with obsolete machinery 
and equipment, with some estimates suggesting that one-third of the capital stock was 
completely useless (Le Dang Doanh 1996). In combination with weak incentive structures and 
poor management practices, the result was low technical efficiency: their financial 
performance was heavily dependent on protection from foreign (or domestic) competition. 
CIEM (1997) reported that most state enterprises were running at a loss and that only 300 
enterprises accounted for 80 percent of the SOE sector’s contributions to the state budget. 
Many SOEs were also forced to borrow capital from other state enterprises, the banking sector 
(which provided preferential credits to SOEs), and other capital sources, creating a significant 
debt burden (although the absence of transparent accounting practices still makes it 
impossible to quantify the total amount of SOE debt).
1 Donors were not only skeptical about 
                                                 
1 At the end of 1995, unpublished data from the Ministry of Finance estimated the aggregate debt of the SOE 
sector at a staggering VND 279,000 billion, or about 20 percent above the country’s GDP (MoF 1997). It is 
likely that this figure included non-convertible debt (to the former CMEA area), but it is not known what 
transferable ruble exchange rate the estimate was based on. The civilian debt obligations to the former Soviet 
Union alone amounted to over 9,400 million transferable rubles in 1994 (IMF 1995). IMF (1999) reported total 
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combination of import substitution and SOE dominance. The concern was that isolation from 
international markets would allow the SOEs to survive without having to undertake necessary 
reforms. This was a particularly sensitive problem since the SOEs and their foreign joint 
venture partners were not only economically important, but also intimately connected with 
various levels of political decision making. In many cases, they were in a position to use their 
political influence to oppose trade liberalization or other reforms that might reduce their 
privileges. In addition, they could to some extent influence future policy decisions through 
their own investment behavior, by influencing the costs for liberalization. The more resources 
the SOEs invested in import substitution before the removal or reduction of trade barriers, the 
higher would be the cost for future trade liberalization. Hence, they could force the 
government into a difficult time inconsistency problem. While a commitment to trade reform 
was desirable ex ante, it might also be optimal to default on some or all of these commitments 
ex post if enough resources were sunk into the old production structure between 
announcement and implementation of trade reforms. The lack of a detailed publicized time 
plan for promised, future tariff reductions increased the risk for this kind of backlash, since it 
implied that the scheme for trade reform was still open for negotiation. The public investment 
plans discussed in the mid-1990s clearly revealed that these worries were relevant. More than 
half of the planned investment spending for the period 1996-2000 was expected to be 
connected with SOEs, often in import substituting industries (UNDP 1996:20ff).  
 
The development of the Vietnamese private sector was stunted by the complex regulatory 
environment and the competition from SOEs benefiting from political contacts and privileged 
access to capital, land, and other resources. The GDP share of the domestic private sector, 
excluding farmers and informal household enterprises, reached only about 7.5 percent in 
1995, while the “modern” private sector, consisting of limited liability companies and 
shareholding companies, accounted for at most one percent of GDP (Webster 1999, Kokko 
2000). The lack of a dynamic private sector was worrying, particularly since it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the SOE sector would not be able to generate enough jobs for the 
rapidly growing labor force. In 1995, the SOEs employed only 1.8 million people out of a 
total labor force of nearly 35 million, with over one million new entrants to the labor force 
each year. 
 
These structural problems and contradictions in economic policy were by no means unknown 
to Vietnamese authorities. On the contrary, the agenda for development cooperation between 
Vietnam and the donor community included the concerns discussed above, and both trade 
reform, SOE reform, and private sector promotion were addressed in the government’s reform 
plans already in the mid-1990s (PFP 1994, SRV 1995, PFP 1996). In the area of international 
trade and investment, the primary aim was to simplify trade regulations. The ambition to 
abolish import permits and import shipment licenses and to allow all enterprises to engage in 
international trade was particularly important. Initially, the overall level of protection was not 
considered a major problem, and the only concrete policy ambitions were to reduce the 
number of tariff lines and to cut the maximum tariff from 100 percent to 60 percent. Other 
measures focused on the foreign exchange market, aiming to eliminate restrictions on current 
account transactions. In the area of FDI, there did not seem to be any need for radical reform: 
the inward FDI commitments in 1996 summed to more than USD 8.6 billion, which was 
considered sufficient for reaching the economy’s development goals. The objectives for SOE 
reform were more far-reaching, presumably because both the World Bank and the IMF 
                                                                                                                                                         
debt of VND 101,439 billion in the SOE sector in 1997, to be compared with total state capital assets of VND 
73,079 billion in the sector.  
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stipulate a clear timetable for the restructuring of the SOE sector, including the identification 
of strategic enterprises to be retained under government ownership and program for the 
divestiture of non-strategic SOEs. Other elements of the plan focused on modern accounting 
rules and reforms in SOE management and governance. These measures did not only aim to 
improve the efficiency of the SOE sector, but they were also important to level the playing 
field for firms from different ownership categories. In addition, the plans included substantial 
legal reform, with revisions of the Commercial Law, Company Law, and Private Enterprise 
Law intended to create a simpler regulatory framework for private enterprise.  
 
All three reform areas have figured prominent in the Vietnamese policy agenda during the 
past decade, but the success in reaching the policy objectives has varied. Trade policy is the 
area where reforms have arguably been most successful. Some progress was made already in 
1995-1997, even though the reform plans met with opposition from interest groups lobbying 
for continued protection. For instance, most domestic firms were given export rights in 
January 1997, at the same time as import licensing requirements for a large number of 
consumer goods were eliminated.
2 The Asian financial crisis in 1997 resulted in a temporary 
backlash, as the reform program was put on hold – in fact, many trade restrictions were 
tightened between 1997 and 1999. The reason was that the crisis led to a fall in the export 
growth rate and the inflow of FDI, forcing authorities to restrict imports of “non-essential” 
goods in order to allocate scarce foreign exchange to the import-dependent industrial sector. 
However, by the end of the 1990s, concerns about the detrimental long-term effects of trade 
restrictions had grown strong enough to motivate further reform. Moreover, the Asian crisis 
had changed the views regarding the possibility to finance investment and imports with 
foreign capital inflows. As noted above, the current account deficits in the mid-1990s had 
exceeded 10 percent of GDP, and the expectation at the time was that these deficits would be 
sustainable (SRV 1995). One of the short and medium term consequences of the Asian crisis 
was a reduction of capital flows to emerging markets: this meant that a larger share of 
Vietnam’s import requirements would have to be financed without foreign assistance, from 
export revenues.  
 
An additional concern in the late 1990s was the need to meet the trade liberalization targets 
set up by AFTA. Until about 1999, Vietnam had been able to fulfill its formal annual tariff 
reduction commitments by listing goods that were either exported or that already met the 5 
percent maximum tariff requirement. Real tariff reductions were required from 2000. At the 
same time, Vietnam also found an opportunity to deepen the relation with the US: the Clinton 
administration was willing to conclude a bilateral trade agreement at terms that were 
relatively favorable for Vietnam. In particular, the agreement promised immediate access to 
the US market, but a gradual liberalization and adjustment of Vietnamese trade policies. The 
agreement was also seen as a stepping stone for future WTO membership – many of the US 
requirements coincided with measures that Vietnam would need to undertake anyway prior to 
WTO accession. Hence, the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) between Vietnam and the US 
was signed in July 2000, institutionalizing the increasing outward orientation in Vietnam’s 
development strategy. Unlike the AFTA agreement, which is based on consensus and does not 
prescribe severe sanctions against member countries that do not fulfill their commitments, 
both the BTA and WTO membership come with stricter conditions, enforcement, and 
sanctions.  
 
                                                 
2 See Decision 28/TTg of January 13, 1997. Trading enterprises were required to hold a minimum working 
capital of USD 200,000, which was a substantial obstacle for private sector participation in international trade. 
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many of the weaknesses that were identified in the mid-1990s (CIE 1997, Kokko 1997). 
Foreign trade rights have been expanded, the tariff structure has been simplified and tariffs 
have been reduced, many quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers have been 
removed, and the foreign exchange market has been deregulated. For instance, all domestic 
enterprises have been allowed to engage in exporting since 1998. A similar liberalization for 
import rights was introduced with the new Enterprise Law that came into force in 2000. The 
average tariff has been reduced to around 15 percent, which is not remarkably high for a 
developing country. All exchange restrictions on current account transactions were removed 
in 2005. The issue that remains most problematic is the relatively extensive use of quantitative 
restrictions. As late as 2000, quantitative restrictions were in effective for 11 imported items: 
petroleum, oil, motor cycles and components, automobiles, construction steel and iron, 
cement, vegetable oil, sugar, paper, alcoholic beverages and construction glass. At that time, 
the plan was to gradually replace these quotas with tariffs, with quotas on fertilizers, cars, and 
cement to be lifted in 2005, construction steel and iron quotas to be lifted in 2007, and those 
for sugar in 2010. However, these plans have not been realized. Instead, the coverage of the 
quota system has varied rather unpredictably over time, with some quotas removed earlier and 
new ones added, e.g. quotas on selected agricultural products in 2003. In early 2006, quotas 
were in place for petroleum products, sugar, salt, and tobacco. Even taking these problems 
into account, the overall assessment of Vietnam’s trade reform program is very positive and it 
is clear that the Vietnamese trade regime does not appear to be more restrictive than the 
standard for low-income developing countries. The progress in the trade policy area has also 
allowed Vietnam to internationalize rapidly, and rate of export growth has consistently 
exceeded even the most ambitious plans. For instance, PFP (1996) assumed that Vietnam 
would be able to double its total exports between 1995 and 2000, from about USD 5 billion to 
USD 10 billion. In reality, the export volume in 2000 exceeded USD 14 billion. Similarly, the 
current 10-year plan for the period 2001-2010 sets the goal that the export growth rate should 
be twice as high as the GDP growth rate: this target will be exceeded by a large margin.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the growth of Vietnam’s external trade during the past 20 years, and 
highlights the rapid increase in export and import volumes. The table also notes the large 
current account deficit, which was threatening to become a serious problem in the mid-1990s. 
It was temporarily reduced after the Asian Crisis in 1997-1998, but a substantial merchandise 
trade deficit has reappeared in recent years. The risks connected to trade and current account 
deficit are lower now than they were a decade ago, thanks to the comprehensive trade policy 
reforms – the incentives to invest in import substituting sectors are weaker than a decade ago. 
Moreover, there is a direct link between the current account deficits and the inflows of foreign 
capital in the form of FDI. New foreign direct investment projects are very import intensive in 
their earliest stages, since much of technology, machinery, and intermediates must be sourced 
outside the country. The resulting trade and current account deficits are sustainable if these 
projects raise the economy’s long-term export capacity (or capacity to compete with imports). 
It is therefore very positive that the structure of inward FDI has become increasingly export 
oriented, and foreign-invested firms are estimated to account for about half of Vietnam’s non-
oil exports today. It is also important to note that substantial inflows of ODA and private 
transfers make it possible for Vietnam to finance much larger trade deficits than a decade ago. 
Yet, considering that the bulk of Vietnam’s total investment resources are used by the state 
sector, in infrastructure projects and SOEs, it is remains important to monitor the use of 
capital and the investment efficiency in this sector.  
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2005 
 
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Exports  0.8 0.9 1.0 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.6 3.0 4.1 5.4 
Imports  2.2 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.5 3.9 5.8 8.2 
Current 
account 
--  --  --  -- -4.0 -1.7 -0.1 -5.8 -7.2 -8.3 
FDI  0  0  0  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.4 
            
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Exports 7.3  9.2  9.4  11.5 14.5 15.0 16.7 20.1 26.5 32.7 
Imports 11.1 11.6 11.6 11.7 15.6 16.2 19.7 25.3 32.0 37.8 
Current 
account 
-8.2 -5.7 -4.0 4.1  3.6  2.1  -1.7 -4.9 -2.0 -1.5 
FDI  2.4 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6  -- 
Sources: East Asian Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2006, Chapter 12. 
Notes: Merchandise exports, imports, and FDI are in billions of current USD. The current 
account balance is in percent of GDP. There are no reliable data to calculate the current 
account / GDP ratio for the period 1986-1988. 
 
The continuing dominance of the SOE sector has also been one of the obstacles for even 
faster integration with the international economy, for instance through WTO membership. 
Although some technical issues related to market access, particularly in the service sectors, 
seem difficult to resolve, it appears that the main obstacles in the discussion about WTO 
membership in the most recent years have been connected to the extensive state involvement 
in industry. For instance, the US has insisted that Vietnam should be considered a “non-
market economy”, which makes it easier to impose anti-dumping tariffs and other temporary 
trade restrictions on Vietnamese exports. This is unfortunate, since an agreement with a “non-
market economy” clause is likely to reduce the incentives for further market oriented reform. 
The WTO negotiations would undoubtedly have been much simpler if the SOE reform 
programs outlined in the mid-1990s had been realized. 
 
However, the SOE reform program has not been very successful, and progress has fallen short 
of plans almost every year since 1996. The two main components of the program are 
equitization – a combination of corporatization and partial privatization – and management 
reform. The number of firms going through equitization was relatively small until 2000, but 
the process has accelerated after that time, and some 2,600 firms had been equitized by early 
2005. However, most of these are relatively small firms, and few large and strategically 
important SOEs have been involved in the process. Moreover, the state remains the largest 
individual owner in most equitized companies. This, together with the fact that management 
reform has been slow, suggests that governance issues will remain on the list of challenges for 
Vietnamese economic development for the foreseeable future. Still, it appears that the SOE 
sector is in better condition today than a decade ago. In the mid-1990s, it was reported that the 
majority of Vietnamese SOEs were barely breaking even (CIEM 1997). In recent years, it 
appears that most SOEs are making some profit, although the bulk of tax contributions still 
originate from a few hundred firms. It remains to be seen how the SOE sector adjusts to the 
increasing competition from imports that follows from the continuing liberalization of the 
trade regulations, as well as the increasing competition from the domestic private sector.  
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effective (see Hakkala and Kokko 2007). A key reform in this area was the new Enterprise 
Law from 2000 that transformed the complex business licensing procedure to a much simpler 
registration process. As a result, well over 100,000 new private firms have been registered 
during the past six years. Although some of these already existed in the informal sector prior 
to their registration, and although many have not managed to survive, the boom in the private 
enterprise sector has contributed strongly to the economy, not least regarding employment 
creation. It is estimated the private sector accounts for most of the 5 million new formal jobs 
that have been created in Vietnam during the past decade. It is also notable that the increasing 
prominence of the private sector has been beneficial from a structural perspective. Without 
access to substantial amounts of capital, most private firms have entered into relatively labor 
intensive sectors, where Vietnam has strong comparative advantages. The SOE sector, by 
contrast, has a bias toward capital intensive sectors and many SOEs are unlikely to survive in 
the long run without protection from foreign competition.  
 
2.3 The Asian Crisis 
The Asian crisis that erupted in Thailand in July 1997 had strong impact on the Vietnamese 
economy, both in real terms and through its effects on the economic reform program. Yet, in 
comparison with most of its ASEAN neighbors, it may appear that Vietnam weathered the 
Asian crisis quite well. Although the rapid growth of the preceding years slowed down, 
Vietnam did not experience any severe recession, Export growth remained. The exchange rate 
was adjusted several times in 1997-1998, but the depreciation of the VND with respect to the 
US dollar was limited to some 30 percent. The rate of inflation accelerated, but remained 
below 10 percent. The most significant negative developments were a substantial reduction in 
foreign direct investment and a decrease in employment. On balance, therefore, the official 
picture did not look very bad, particularly in comparison with the deep recession plaguing 
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea. 
 
The fact that Vietnam was relatively mildly affected by the Asian crisis, however, had more to 
do with controls and regulations than with sound economic fundamentals. The exchange rate 
was relatively stable because the VND was not freely convertible, and because both trade and 
foreign exchange transactions were strictly regulated. The withdrawal of foreign portfolio 
capital from Asia’s emerging markets did not hurt Vietnam, because the weakly developed 
financial market did not attract much foreign capital in the first place. There was no stock 
market collapse, because there was no stock market. Aside from these features, the country 
shared many characteristics with the rest of the region. In fact, most of the structural 
weaknesses that contributed to the crisis in other Asian countries could be found in Vietnam 
as well. Many of the SOEs that dominate the manufacturing sector were inefficient and 
unprofitable. Due to their low profitability, many of them were forced to borrow capital from 
other state enterprises, the banking sector, and other capital sources, which created a complex 
maze of cross-subsidization and indebtedness. There were no reliable data on the aggregate 
debt of the SOE sector – in fact, Nguyen Minh Tu (1997) argued that the government itself 
did not have detailed knowledge of the financial situation of SOEs – but it is likely that many 
firm were technically bankrupt. In addition to domestic debt, some SOEs had been able to 
borrow in the international market, contributing to the country’s growing external debt. At the 




The debt problems of the SOEs were not only a potential burden for the state budget, but they 
also weighed heavily on an already fragile financial sector. Although the banking sector 
comprised around 80 commercial banks in 1996, most were small and the four largest state-
owned banks accounted for over 75 percent of assets and credits. Their operations were not 
only based on commercial decisions, but also influenced by political objectives. SOEs 
enjoyed various privileges, such as easier access to foreign currency loans, subsidized interest 
rates, and less stringent collateral requirements than private firms. Consequently, more than 
half of the banking systems’ aggregate lending was directed to SOEs, and the banks were 
heavily exposed to the weaknesses of the SOEs.  
 
In addition, because of their limited experience with market-based financial transactions, the 
banks were vulnerable to the kind of moral hazard problems that plagued other Asian 
countries. Leung and Le Dang Doanh (1998) suggested that the “mini” financial crisis of 
1996-97 provided a good illustration of these weaknesses. In 1996, lending restrictions were 
liberalized and state-owned commercial banks were allowed to start issuing letters of credit to 
finance the international trade transactions of SOEs. In practice, this was equivalent to 
increasing short term lending in foreign currencies. The total amount of outstanding letters of 
credit grew to about 7.5 percent of GDP (over USD 1.5 billion) by the beginning of 1997. 
However, instead of using the credits for trade financing, a number of SOEs channeled the 
funds into real estate investments and other speculative uses.  
 
Many of these investments failed, and an estimated 40 percent of the guaranteed letters of 
credit had become bad loans in early 1997. Several commercial banks defaulted on their 
letters of credit, which eventually necessitated a costly State Bank rescue operation that 
reduced the country’s international reserves significantly. Another consequence was a 
downgrading of Vietnam’s sovereign credit rating from Ba3 to C. By September 1997, before 
any real impact of the regional crisis had yet been felt, the overdue debts of Vietnamese banks 
had thus grown to 12.7 percent of their total lending, corresponding to over 100 percent of 
their capital and reserves (IMF 1998). The Vietnamese authorities responded by introducing 
various controls to avoid similar credit expansions in the future. Yet, serious problems 
remained and the banking system was probably in a worse condition than what its financial 
statements indicated (IMF 1998).  
 
The development in the trade sector provided another reason for worry. Although exports had 
grown at an average annual rate of nearly 30 percent between 1991 and 1996, imports had 
increased even faster, with widening trade and current account deficits as a result. The trade 
deficit exceeded 10 percent of GDP already in 1994, and grew to about 15 percent of GDP in 
1996. The acute problems concerned the financing of the deficit. Until 1996, it had appeared 
easy to finance the import surplus, since optimistic expectations about the future of the 
Vietnamese economy had generated large inflows of foreign assets in the form of ODA, 
private transfers, and FDI. However, the situation started to deteriorate in 1996. The growth in 
FDI inflows stagnated, and it was necessary to finance a large share of the current account 
deficit with increased borrowing. The disbursement of medium and long term loans almost 
doubled between 1995 and 1996, the rapid expansion in the amount of outstanding letters of 
credit discussed above provided easy – but temporary – short term financing, and arrears on 
                                                 
3 In addition, Vietnam owed about 10 billion rubles to the former Soviet Union. At the time, it was not known 
how this would be valued. 
  12scheduled repayments began to accumulate. At the beginning of 1997, it was understood that 
a serious balance-of-payments (BoP) crisis could emerge unless the current account deficit 
was contained.  
 
The response was a combination of a very severe tightening of import controls and gradual 
devaluations, to promote exports. Strict quantitative restrictions and temporary import 
prohibitions were introduced to limit imports of consumer goods (including cars, motorcycles, 
bicycles, beverages, sugar, and confectioneries) and commodities such as cement, glass, 
paper, and steel. Apart from reducing the import surplus, it appears that the import bans also 
aimed to help local firms, mainly joint ventures and affiliates of foreign multinationals, reduce 
their large inventories (CIEM 1998, IMF 1998). In the first quarter of 1997, the target 
exchange rate was VND 11,175 per USD, with a narrow fluctuation band of only +/- 1 
percent. The band was widened to 5 percent in March 1997 and further to 10 percent in 
October 1997. Since the market rate immediately moved to the upper end of the band, these 
adjustments constituted de facto devaluations of the currency. During 1998, the target rate 
was changed several times, with the exchange rate depreciating to about VND 13,940 per 
USD in early 1998. Overall, this constituted a depreciation of about 20 percent. In addition to 
formal trade policy measures and devaluation, currency controls were also used to curb 
imports. Firms were obliged to deposit their foreign exchange earnings in designated 
commercial banks and the allocation of foreign exchange to potential importers was subject to 
a licensing procedure managed by the State Bank. Export oriented companies and “strategic” 
SOEs and foreign investors had privileged access to foreign exchange (although foreign 
investors were obliged to be self-sufficient in foreign currency), but the imports of all other 
companies were easily controlled through the licensing system. For instance, restrictions in 
the allocation of foreign currency and letters of credit were among the main instruments used 
to uphold the “consumer goods import restriction list” announced in February 1997.
4 This 
way, import growth was restricted to only a few percent in 1997. Since exports continued 
growing at a rate of about 20 percent, the trade deficit shrank to between 8 and 10 percent.
5 
However, the severe trade restrictions undermined investor confidence. For instance, there 
was a 50 percent drop in applications for FDI licenses in 1997. Reports in the international 
press suggested that many foreign investors were scaling down their operations or closing 
altogether. For instance, in the first two months of 1998, 176 representative offices in Ho Chi 
Minh City were closed (Marshall 1998). 
 
In spite of these responses, the growth rate fell from over 8 percent in 1997 to about half of 
that in 1998 and 1999.
6 By 2000, growth recovered to nearly 7 percent, helped by increasing 
oil revenues and stronger export performance, driven largely by the increasing outward 
orientation of the economy, manifested e.g. by the bilateral trade agreement with the US. In 
retrospect, it seems that the most important consequence of the Asian crisis was the insight 
                                                 
4 This list included most consumer goods, from food products to chemicals and electronic equipment. See Viet 
Nam News, February 28, 1997. 
5 The imprecise figure on the trade deficit motivates a comment on the lack of transparency. Reliable data on 
economic fundamentals are hard to come by, although newspapers and government reports overflow with 
seemingly precise statistics. One problem that data from various sources are seldom consistent. Another problem 
is that some information – e.g. details on the government budget - is not published. It is hardly necessary to add a 
caveat about data quality.  
6 The data on Vietnamese growth rates (as well as other statistics) differ substantially by source, and it is difficult 
to obtain complete data sets from the same source. For example, while official Vietnamese data indicate a 
growth rate of nearly 5 percent in 1998 and nearly 6 percent in 1999 (see Table 1), the corresponding estimates 
presented by IMF (2003) are 3.5 and 4.2 percent. In particualar, there is reason to be cautious in the 
interpretation of older data.  
  13that external balance is an important component of successful economic development. The 
developments during the late 1980s and early 1990s had clearly demonstrated the importance 
of internal balance, with a reasonably combination of growth and price stability. The 
development experiences from the region – summarized in the excitement about the Asian 
Miracle – had also demonstrated the potential growth benefits of outward orientation. 
However, the extraordinarily easy access to foreign capital during the early 1990s may have 
given the impression that external balance would not be any cause for concern: capital inflows 
were expected to adjust to fill the needs identified by the policy makers. However, the crisis 
showed that external balance does not only matter in the abstract long term, but that it is also a 
short term concern. Economic policies need to be designed with attention to internal as well 
as external balance. In this respect, Vietnam has become more similar to other small open 
economies that have for a long time struggled with similar policy challenges. 
 
2.4 Today: growth, stability, and social concerns 
Vietnam’s economic development during the last few years has been favorable, and several of 
the problems that were discussed a decade ago seem to be under control. Real annual GDP 
growth has averaged over 7 percent since 2000, with a growth rate of around 7.5 percent 
reported both for 2004 and 2005. In real terms, this corresponds to a 40 percent increase in 
average per capita income since the turn of the century. Growth has been fuelled mainly by 
high investment rates – in the past two years, over 36 percent of GDP has been devoted to 
investment – and rapid export expansion. Vietnam’s export volume has more than doubled 
since 2001. In 2004 alone, export revenue increased by almost 30 percent, reaching a total 
value of over USD 26 billion or 56 percent of GDP. In 2005, the export volume continued 
expanding well above the USD 30 billion mark.  
 
Foreign investors have been important both for investments and export growth. The inflows 
of FDI have recovered strongly after the slump following the Asian crisis, and actual 
investments grew from around USD 3 billion in 2000 to nearly USD 4 billion in 2004 
(Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 2005).
7 Foreign-invested enterprises account for over 15 percent 
of GDP, nearly one-fifth of total investment, and more than half of total exports including 
crude oil (excluding crude oil, the FDI share of exports is about one-third). The development 
of the private sector has also been encouraging, and private firms account for an increasing 
share of employment and investment. Yet, the state sector still dominates, controlling 55-60 
percent of total investment and nearly 40 percent of GDP. In fact, the state’s share of GDP has 
increased somewhat since 2000, which may be appear contradictory taking into account the 
progress of the private sector. However, the GDP share of the non-state sector includes 
agriculture, where growth rates are substantially lower than the average – the private sector’s 
shares of industrial output and employment are growing steadily.  
´ 
The one macroeconomic indicator that is slightly worrying is the inflation rate. The rate of 
price increases stayed low until 2003, but inflation has accelerated during the past two years – 
this applies both for products like oil and steel, where the international price level has 
increased steeply, as well as domestic food products, where prices did not recede after the 
customary pre-Tet price increases. According to official statistics, the rate of inflation 
remained slightly below 10 percent in both 2004 and 2005, although there are large variations 
                                                 
7 The data on implemented FDI from the Ministry of Planning and Investment are systematically higher than the 
data on FDI disbursements from the State Bank of Vietnam. One reason is that the MPI figures include the local 
capital shares, but the difference is still disturbingly large. In 2004, the SBV reported FDI disbursements of USD 
1.6 billion, as seen in Table 2. 
  14across product groups. The problem is that it may be difficult to maintain a stable exchange 
rate to the USD if Vietnam’s inflation rate is substantially higher than that in the US: a higher 
inflation rate tends to reduce the competitiveness of Vietnamese firms, worsening the current 
account imbalances and creating pressures for devaluations. At the same time, there is a risk 
that a devaluation of the currency may create macroeconomic uncertainty, causing increases 
in import prices and further inflationary pressures. These concerns are increasingly important 
for Vietnam. One reason is the increasing trade ratio. A decade ago, exports plus imports 
accounted for 70-80 percent of GDP, but the same ratio today exceeds 130 percent of GDP. 
This means that small variations in competitiveness have much larger effects on the 
macroeconomy today than ten years ago. Another reason is the liberalization of the trade 
regime. A decade ago, Vietnam could respond to external shocks by tightening or introducing 
various quantitative restrictions on trade and foreign exchange transactions. These instruments 
are out of bounds for today’s decisionmakers, which means that the exchange rate plays a 
more important role for the economy. The concern for price stability, exchange rate stability, 
and growth is, of course, not unique to Vietnam but a standard challenge for well known in 
other open economies as well, developed as well as developing.  
 
Moreover, Vietnam continues to put heavy emphasis on economic growth for political 
reasons, and it is not likely that the government is prepared to take strong measures to reduce 
aggregate demand. One strong reason is the increasing demand for public social services, in 
particular health and education. During the past decades, Vietnam has chosen to shift a large 
share of the financing burden for health and education from the state budget to individual 
households in process that is somewhat paradoxically called socialization – the various social 
groups and communities are expected to take the responsibility for financing. This has created 
substantial social gaps in access to health and education, and the strong concern for equity and 
social stability is likely to result in demands for increased state investment in these sectors 
(see Kokko and Tingvall in the present volume). Another reason to expect demands for 
expansionary rather than contractionary policies is the uneven regional development in 
Vietnam. Although the past 20 years have witnessed a remarkable reduction in poverty 
incidence, with the share of the population living in absolute poverty falling by well over half 
during the past decades, the gains have been unevenly distributed. Growth has been 
concentrated to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City with surrounding provinces, and there are no 
clear signs of convergence in provincial income and development levels (Kokko and Tingvall 
2005). One determinant of the provincial development gaps is the uneven distribution of 
infrastructure: the demands on regional development policy and broad infrastructure programs 
are likely to increase in the future. Hence, fiscal policy is not likely to contribute much to 
reducing aggregate demand. 
 
The continuing dominance of the state sector is another cause for concern. Although the 
private sector is expanding, the state sector still controls most of the country’s investment 
resources and there are worries that the investments are not efficient. The direct employment 
generated through state investment is small – the total employment in the state sector amounts 
to about 10 percent of the labor force, and has barely increased during the past decade – and 
there are frequent complaints about problems at all stages in the public investment process, 
ranging from planning to implementation (CIEM 2005). The concerns apply both for 
investments in SOEs and public infrastructure. These investments are expected to raise future 
production capacity, and it is assumed that the investment resources are used for projects that 
yield a high social return. For investments in industry, a key question is whether the enterprise 
will be able to survive in the more competitive climate that is expected as Vietnam joins the 
WTO in the near future. For infrastructure projects, the requirements are related to how well 
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and capital inflows to Vietnam are presently at a high level – roughly comparable to those in 
China
8 – does not reduce these concerns. On the contrary, the availability of large amounts of 
capital makes it important to invest these funds efficiently, since there are often important 
lock-in effects of investments. Once large amounts of funds are committed to specific 
projects, they create interest groups that benefit from these investments and that are likely to 
try to maintain status quo even when it would be socially beneficial to change the direction of 
policies. Hence, establishing effective mechanisms for allocating public investment resources 
to the most efficient uses should be a priority. 
 
However, on this point, the current developments in Vietnam appear uncertain. Although 
management practices and other skills in the banking sector have improved over time, it 
seems clear that an increasing share of government controlled lending is finding other outlets 
where management and decision making is less transparent and less rigorous. Part of this 
process is intentional and follows from decisions in 1999 to move all policy lending from the 
state-owned commercial banks to the Development Assistance Fund (DAF). Since policy 
lending is often based on other determinants than economic performance, it is reasonable to 
transfer it away from commercial banks that face strong demands to become more business 
oriented and to improve their lending practices and skills in project assessment and risk 
management. However, it seems that many SOEs that are not directly subject to policy 
lending have also moved from commercial banks to other sources of financing. This is likely 
to be a partial explanation for the falling share of SOEs in the lending operations of the formal 
bank sector. 
 
The motive to move from formal banks to other financing institutes is probably related to the  
less stringent requirements for financial information, business plans, and collateral in these 
institutes. There are two or three of these alternative sources of financing that have emerged 
in Vietnam in recent years. The most prominent is the DAF, which channels funds from ODA 
and other sources (such as government bonds) to infrastructure and SOE investments. The 
total amount of resources available for this kind of off-budget public investment exceeds 10 
percent of GDP, and is likely to increase in the future. Discussing the sustainability of the 
DAF, IMF (2006) notes the substantial risks involved in its operations, and calls for 
increasing accountability and transparency in the use of funds. Moreover, IMF (2006) also 
argues that the liabilities of the DAF should be incorporated in public debt statistics to make it 
possible to correctly assess the country’s fiscal position.  
 
A substantial share of the DAF’s funding is drawn from the Social Insurance Fund (SIF), 
which administrates the pension and health insurance contributions of all Vietnamese formal 
sector employees. Given the all formal employees are mandated to pay 18 percent of their 
gross salary to the SIF – at the same time as the pension payments from the Fund will not start 
growing rapidly for another 5 to 10 years (since at least 15 years of contributions are required 
to qualify for full pensions) – it seems clear that the total value of the Fund will grow very 
substantially in coming years. At present, the SIF is investing mainly in government bonds 
and DAF bonds, which are considered very safe but have low yields, but there is pressure to 
raise yields by taking on more risky investments. The most likely investment objects in that 
                                                 
8 The capital inflows to Vietnam in 2004 included FDI valued at between USD 1.5 billion (according to SBV) 
and USD 4 billion (according to MPI), officially recorded overseas remittances of USD 2.4 billion, and ODA 
inflows of about USD 2 billion (in 2003). To reach an equally large inflow of foreign capital per capita, China 
would require between USD 85 billion and USD 115 billion per year, which is roughly in line with the capital 
account balance of the Chinese balance of payments in recent years (Prasad and Wei 2005, Table 6).  
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the SIF as well: taking into account that it manages pension funds, it may be appropriate to 
require even stricter regulation and supervision than for the DAF. 
 
A third source of non-bank financing for Vietnam’s SOEs has recently been introduced in the 
form of government guaranteed bonds issued in the international market. The first major 
example is from late 2005, when the Ministry of Finance floated a USD 750 million bond in 
the US market, and channeled the proceeds to Vinashin, Vietnam’s state-owned shipbuilding 
company. The bond issue was considered successful since it was fully subscribed, but is clear 
that this was largely due to the government guarantee: a corporate bond issued directly by 
Vinashin would have been classified as a junk bond, and would have been difficult to sell 
even with a very substantial risk premium. However, it is still unknown how the funds will be 
used, and there are question marks regarding the efficiency of the planned investments. 
Moreover, the decision to issue a foreign bond seems somewhat at odds with the objective to 
maintain price stability. A domestically issued USD bond would probably have been less 
costly, and it would not have added to aggregate demand in a situation where inflation is 
already a problem. 
 
This illustrates some of the problems connected to monetary policy in Vietnam. Apart from 
the fact that Vietnam’s money market is weakly developed, meaning that open market 
operations are inefficient, there does not seem to be much coordination between the State 
Bank and the Ministry of Finance. This is particularly problematic since the volume of 
government bonds issued by the Treasury is substantially larger than volume of the State 
Bank’s open market operations. Instead, the main instruments for monetary policy are the 
State Bank’s refinancing rate and the reserve requirement. However, the efficiency of these 
instruments is weak: Vietnam applies a fixed exchange rate regime, which essentially shifts 
the responsibility for price stability from monetary policy to fiscal policy. Apart from the 
inherent tension between growth and price stability, it can therefore be argued that Vietnam 
faces an additional restriction through the fixed exchange regime.  
 
As noted earlier, these challenges for macroeconomic policy are not unique to Vietnam, but 
rather endemic to all small, open economies. The key components of the macroeconomic 
stability equation are related to the determinants of fiscal and monetary policy, with particular 
emphasis on the exchange rate. In the Vietnamese case, these issues have not moved to the 
top of the policy agenda yet, which is partly explained by the remaining regulations and 
restrictions for trade and capital flow and partly related to luck. More specifically, Vietnam 
has maintained a fixed exchange rate to the USD, which has depreciated substantially since 
2002, and allowed Vietnam to some extent to brush aside the debate about the exchange rate 
regime. However, with systematically higher Vietnamese inflation, it will be hard to avoid 
pressure on the exchange rate and discussions about policy alternatives in these areas. 
 
What are then Vietnam’s options, and what institutional developments will be required in 
fiscal policy, monetary policy, and exchange rate management. Some elements are easy to 
identify, such as closer collaboration between the State Bank and the Ministry of Finance, 
development of money markets and the financial sector in general, and stricter regulation and 
supervision of the policy lending that is channeled through the DAF, the SIF, and government 
guaranteed bond issues. Other decisions – in particular regarding major questions like the 
exchange rate regime – are more difficult, since they have very far-reaching effects for public 
governance and macroeconomic management in general. One way to approach these very 
substantial questions is to examine the experiences of other countries, to identify where the 
  17major challenges are likely to occur once some specific institutional solution has been chosen. 
The following sections will therefore discuss some of the features of Swedish macroeconomic 
development during the past 20 or 25 years: during this relatively short period, Sweden has 
gone through a spectrum of different regimes and cumulated more experiences than most 
other countries. 
 
3. Experiences from Sweden 
 
During the decade from the early 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden went through a 
transition from a closely regulated to a fully deregulated economy where most decisions are 
made in the market place. This transition episode includes a number of mistakes that resulted 
in a financial crisis in the early 1990s, with severe macroeconomic costs. When the 
deregulation commenced, neither households, firms, banks, nor the state were prepared to 
operate effectively in a deregulated economy. Since there were few countries that had 
liberalized their financial markets earlier, the possibilities to learn from others were limited. 
However, the Swedish experiences may be useful for other small, open economies searching 
for ways to combine internal and external balance in an increasingly internationalized 
business environment. This section therefore reviews the Swedish macroeconomic 
experiences during the last decades in the wake of the extensive de- and re-regulations that 
took place in the economy.  
  
3.1 The regulatory environment before the 1980s 
Since the 1930s, the Swedish macroeconomy had been subject to far-reaching regulations in 
many areas and forms, particularly in the financial sector. For example, on the domestic side 
almost half of Swedish banks’ lending was reserved by the government for two specific 
purposes; to finance the construction of housing and to finance fiscal budget deficits. Lending 
for these purposes had to be at low and fixed interest rates so that the fiscal budget would be 
able to finance the growing welfare state and to make it possible for low and medium income 
households to afford good housing.  
 
For the other half of the lending, banks could decide to whom they wanted to lend.  However, 
the Riksbank (the Swedish central bank) set quantitative credit ceilings for each bank. The 
aim was mainly to prevent excessive inflation. Moreover, there were rules for banks´ interest 
rates on the deposit as well as the lending side. Cash reserve requirements were also applied 
to give the Riksbank an instrument to influence liquidity and interest rates.   
 
In addition, international capital movements were heavily restricted. The krona – the Swedish 
currency – had a fixed exchange rate.  Extensive capital regulations aimed at maintaining the 
fixed exchange rate and to protect the domestic credit market from international capital flows.  
For example, Swedish export companies’ earnings in foreign currencies had to be exchanged 
to kronor. Corporations were thus not allowed to hold accounts in foreign currencies. 
Furthermore, investment abroad required permission from the Riksbank. Swedish households 
were not allowed to buy shares in companies outside Sweden and borrowing in foreign 
currency was restricted.  There were also restrictions on foreign investment in Sweden.  
 
Despite all these measures, the Swedish krona was devalued several times during the first 10 
years after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. The Swedish currency appreciated 
throughout the 1970s because Swedish inflation rate was higher than the average among 
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account deficits. Ambitious employment targets contributed to fiscal deficits and excessive 
wage rates. Regular devaluations became the favored way to avoid unemployment. The 
devaluations led to lack of confidence in the stability of the exchange rate. This in turn caused 
high inflation expectations and high wage demands in a vicious circle.  
 
The regulations aiming at stabilizing the GDP growth rate and the welfare state served the 
economy well in many ways, but precluded it from taking advantage of the rapidly growing 
international financial markets. Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, the efficiency of the 
regulations began to erode as the financial sector found ways to circumvent various 
restrictions.  
 
The regulations also created other incentives and skills than those in demand in liberalized 
markets. For example, the credit ceilings and the lack of differentiation in lending rates 
reduced competition in the banking sector. The establishment of new banks and bank 
branches required permissions from the authorities, which also reduced competition. The 
lending ceilings and low real interest rates led to a substantial unsatisfied demand for 
borrowing by companies and households, which created incentives for banks to lend to the 
lowest risks in order to minimize losses. Hence, the banks did not have to develop skills and 
methods for dealing with risk.  
 
3.2 The 1980s: deregulations and their macroeconomic impact 
In the period 1980-1985, the domestic quantitative restrictions were gradually abolished. The 
foreign exchange restrictions did however remain until 1989. Technical innovations and 
growth in the financial markets – domestic as well as international – gradually reduced the 
efficiency of the regulations and were important reasons for the liberalization.   
 
During the 1980s, the krona was tied to a trade-weighted basket of currencies allowing for 
fluctuations within a band of +/- 1.5 percent.  A large devaluation of the krona in 1982 was 
intended to be a starting point for developing the krona into a hard currency. The Riksbank 
and the Treasury emphasized that this would be the last devaluation, after a period between 
1976 and 1982 when there had been a number of devaluations accumulating to a XX percent 
lower value of the krona. In contrast to the previous devaluations, the objective of the 1982 
devaluation was not only to restore Swedish competitiveness after a period of higher inflation 
than in neighboring countries, but also to rectify structural imbalances in the economy. It was 
believed that that too small a part of the economy was exposed to competition. This 
imbalance was reflected in more or less permanent deficits in public finances and in the 
current account balance.  
 
By starting the reorientation with a large devaluation, the government wanted to stimulate the 
sector that was exposed to competition. It was also of great importance to demonstrate clearly 
and unambiguously that there was political support for the new “hard line” exchange rate 
policy. In part this was done through a rule that prohibited the government from increasing 
the borrowing in foreign currencies. The motivation was that an isolated domestic credit 
market was expected to be self-regulating: if fiscal policy became too expansive it would 
result in higher domestic interest rates, partly discouraging the government from further 
borrowing.  
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stimulate both a money market and a secondary market.  Two years earlier, banks had been 
allowed to emit short term bank certificates for the same reason. Well functioning bond and 
money markets were important when regulations for lending and deposit rates were abolished. 
After these events the Riksbank could affect the market interest rate mainly by liquidity 
management and the prime rate.  
  
However, inflation expectations remained high, partly due to Sweden’s long history of 
devaluations. Coupled with the expansion of credit following the full deregulation of the 
credit market in 1985, this caused wages and inflation to rise steeply. Private consumption 
expanded rapidly after the abolition of the quantitative regulations of the credit market. 
During the period 1985 to 1990, the credit volume increased by an average of 16 percent each 
year, which was a very high rate considering that the average increase in real GDP was only a 
couple of percent per year. Heavy borrowing from both households and firms and a booming 
international economy led to sharp price increases in the equity and real estate markets. In 
addition, when the credit market was deregulated the prevailing tax system was still structured 
in such a way that it favored accumulation of debt. Nominal interest expenditures in the late 
1980s produced tax relief of approximately 50 percent. This meant that the real rate of interest 
after tax was negative. Despite these unattractive characteristics, reform of the tax system was 
not politically feasible at the time the credit market was deregulated. 
 
At the same time banks were in a completely new situation following the credit market 
deregulation, and they did not have internal systems for controlling new risk. They focused 
more on market shares than on risk, which exacerbated the increase in credit volume. A large 
part of loans was investment in housing or commercial real estate and most of this was 
collateralized by real estate, which put upward pressure on real estate prices. High real estate 
prices lead to higher asset prices. This in turn raised collateral values, which facilitated further 
borrowing, which consequently increased the upward pressure on asset prices. Especially in 
metropolitan areas, real estate prices skyrocketed. Capital requirements were gradually 
increased during the 1980s and harmonized among different institutions. Sweden introduced 
the Basle I capital requirement 1990, which resulted in higher requirements especially for 
mortgage institutions. 
           
With a fixed exchange rate, the possibilities to employ monetary policy in areas other than 
managing the exchange rate were severely limited. Meanwhile, the international mobility of 
capital increased steadily during the 1980s. Combined with the undermining and eventually 
formal termination of the domestic credit market regulations, this meant that the Riksbank had 
limited scope for increasing domestic interest rates in order to dampen the demand for credit. 
In addition, low sensitivity to interest rates due to the tax system, notably in the household 
sector, further reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
 
It thereby became the task of fiscal policy to offset the strong inflationary pressures created by 
the expansion of credit. This assignment failed. The government budget did show small 
surpluses during the second half of the 1980s, but the economy was overheated and a 
progressive tax system without indexation contributed to the surplus. Adjusted for cyclical 
factors, fiscal policy was actually expansive. Viewed in relation to the overheating, with open 
unemployment below 2 percent and private consumption at an historically high level, public 
finances should have shown considerably greater surpluses.  
 
  20At the same time, responsibility for price and wage formation primarily rested on the social 
partners – the labor unions and the employers’ federation. It had been made clear at the time 
of the devaluation in 1982 that the exchange rate would be maintained. Consequently, price 
and pay increases that were far higher than the surrounding world would lead to an 
undermining of competitiveness and reduced employment.  
 
Despite a long period of real appreciation of the currency caused by higher inflation than 
abroad, the credibility for the fixed exchange rate seemed to be high during the overheated 
period in the second half of the 1980s. Currency outflows from the current account deficit and 
investment in real estate abroad were met by borrowing from foreign banks in foreign 
currency, which was attractive because foreign interest rates were lower than the Swedish 
ones. Half of the commercial banks’ lending volume at the end of the 1980s was denominated 
in foreign currency. Borrowing in foreign currency often financed real investments in Sweden 
which made Swedish companies as well as the banks exposed to changes in the exchange rate.  
 
Despite substantial decreases in competitiveness, the unemployment rate was low. A strong 
international economy and strong growth in sectors that were not exposed to competition, 
such as the service sector and the construction sector, offset the negative effects of losses in 
export market shares.  
 
3.3 From overheating to depression – the crisis years 1991-93 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the economy was still in an upswing. Open unemployment was 
approximately 1.5 percent and GDP growth was above its trend level. The government budget 
was in surplus. Yet there were clear indications of internal imbalances, in addition to the 
external imbalance characterized by large current account deficits. The rate of inflation was 
approximately 7 per cent and nominal wages were increasing by almost 10 percent per year. 
Pushed by a rapid expansion of credit, prices of commercial real estate had risen rapidly. 
 
The turn in the course of development of the economy during the following years was both 
swift and strong. At the end of 1993, open unemployment had increased to almost 9 per cent. 
The government deficit reached 12 percent of GDP and government debt grew rapidly. In 
1991-1993, GDP declined for three consecutive years and the economy shrank by 6 
percentage points. This development forced Sweden to abandon the fixed exchange rate in fall 
of 1992. Instead, the krona got a floating exchange rate for the first time since the 1930s. A 
bank crisis and fiscal crisis forced the government to make major commitments to restore 
confidence in the bank sector and to prevent a systemic crisis. 
 
The crises developed gradually. During the winter of 1989-1990, the government proposed 
statutory interventions in price and wage formation to contain the cost and price pressures 
caused by the overheated economy: the measures included a pay freeze, a rental freeze, a 
freeze on increases in local government taxes, restrictions in the right to take industrial action, 
and increased penalties for illegal strikes. But the government lost the vote in the parliament, 
the Riksdag. The political uncertainty in early 1990 spread to the foreign exchange market. A 
strong outflow of currency took place for the first time since 1985. The Riksbank was obliged 
to make purchases to support the krona to defend the exchange rate.  
 
This eroded the credibility and sustainability of the fixed exchange rate. One explanation was 
that there were clear indications of an imminent financial downturn. This was due both to 
external and internal factors. The international business cycle slackened and Sweden lost 
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increases. When growth diminished and unemployment started to increase, the Swedish 
economy was once again in the kind of situation that had traditionally resulted in a 
devaluation of the krona.. 
 
In the fall of 1990, the lack of confidence spread rapidly throughout the Swedish financial 
market. Credit losses in finance companies spread to the banks. The situation in the banking 
sector turned worse when interest rates were raised to very high levels in order to combat the 
pressure on the fixed exchange rate. The Riksbank gave loans on special terms to banks and 
mortgage institutions to soften the impact of the high interest rate, although it was clear that 
the risk for credit losses was rising. In the previously hot market for commercial property, 
rental levels fell, leading to a fall in both prices and turnover in the property market. In the 
same way as lending and property prices were driven upwards in the 1980s in a self-
reinforcing spiral, they now both turned downwards. The stock market fell in response to the 
dawning recession. In combination with the ongoing economic downturn, this meant that the 
Swedish banks’ financing, in particular in foreign currency, was threatened: the banks’ 
foreign lenders began to call into question their payment capacity and solvency. Sweden was 
threatened by a financial system crisis, and it was feared that this could seriously damage the 
national economy in a situation that was already considered critical.  
 
The effect was a swift decline in both private consumption and capital expenditure, in 
particular in real estate investment. The Swedish commercial paper market ceased to function. 
Asset prices and saving were also affected by a tax reform that was carried out in stages in 
1990–91. A central idea in the reform was to encourage savings and discourage borrowing. 
Other key principles were uniformity and a striving for low tax rates and broad tax bases. This 
meant among other things that a separate uniform tax on capital income was introduced, with 
a flat tax rate of 30 percent. Earlier, capital income had been added to other types of incomes 
and taxed at substantially higher rates – for many middle class income earners, well over 50 
percent. Similarly, interest payments had been deducted from aggregate income, reducing tax 
obligations by more than 50 percent on the margin. One result of the reform was therefore that 
the value of interest deductions was reduced, which increased the real cost of borrowing after 
tax. This contributed to reducing the price of houses and tenant-owned housing. This also 
contributed indirectly to increased saving. The real debt ratio of households increased which 
strengthened the motivation to reduce loans, i.e. to save by amortization. The tax reform 
contributed to reinforcing the downturn in the economy: the restraining effect on private 




Up until the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime in fall of 1992, the government 
repeated the objective of a fixed exchange rate as a basis for monetary and foreign exchange 
policy. The division of responsibility in economic policy was clearly expressed: 
 
The Swedish credit market is practically wholly integrated with the surrounding world. In the 
light of this, the Riksbank’s monetary policy has become increasingly focused on balancing 
currency outflows by adaptations to the domestic level of interest rates. Monetary policy can 
                                                 
9 According to the calculation reported by KUSK, an estimated approximately one percentage point of a total fall 
in real GDP from 1991-93 of 5 per cent can be derived from the tax reform. A summary of KUSK and the 
government’s evaluation of the tax reform, including its effects on cyclical developments, are reported in 
Government Bill 1997/98:1, Annex 6. 
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responsibility for creating the prerequisites for low inflation and stable growth.
10
 
In only a couple of years time, the Swedish economy had ended up in a situation which was a 
mirror image of the 1980s. Then it was not possible to increase real interest rates since the 
fixed exchange rate was perceived as credible. Now it could not be reduced despite the 
economy going steeply downwards, since the credibility of the exchange rate regime was 
weak. At the same time, public finances continued to worsen. Every third krona of 
expenditure in the central government budget was borrowed and approximately a third of 
expenditure was for interest payments on central government debt. Public finances were 
thereby not sustainable in the long term. The increasingly poor development of the Swedish 
economy led to the krona being sensitive to disturbances. An extensive outflow of currency 
took place. 
 
The government faced a troublesome trade-off. On the one hand, there was a risk that 
continued high interest rates caused by the imbalance in public finances would delay the 
economic recovery. On the other hand, there was a risk that rapid and extensive budget 
reinforcements would result in an excessively strong tightening, which could also delay or 
interrupt the expected cyclical upswing.  
 
In the Budget Bill in 1993, the government stated consolidation of public finances as a main 
task of economic policy. This was described as a condition to “increase confidence in 
economic policy and make a sustainably lower interest rate level possible”.
11 
 
Half a year earlier, the fixed exchange regime had come to an end as the Riksbank gave up its 
defence of the krona. Once free to float, the krona depreciated by 25 percent. In January 1993, 
the Riksbank set itself a new monetary policy: the objective was to aim at an inflation rate 
(measured with CPI) of 2 percent with a symmetric interval of ± 1 percentage point.  
 
3.4 After the crises: a new playing field for economic policy 
A substantial consolidation program was carried out between 1994 and 1998. The program 
entailed a permanent reinforcement of public finances equivalent to 8 percent of GDP. It was 
designed according to three basic principles. Firstly, it was to take effect swiftly so that the 
increase in central government debt was checked at an early stage, although the effects were 
to be distributed over a number of years so that the effect on demand would not be too great. 
Secondly, it was designed from the point of view of distribution policy, so that those with 
high incomes contributed most. Thirdly, priority was given to public activities such as 
education, health care and social services above transfers to households. 
 
The measures to achieve credible, long-term sustainable public finances also entailed a clearer 
target formulation for budget policy by introduction of targets for the public financial balance 
and expenditure ceilings. Work on the budget was also given a firmer regulatory framework 
through a new budget act and through changes in the budget process in the government and 
the Riksdag. These institutional changes were as important for the consolidation work as the 
exact design and distribution over time of the measures in the Consolidation Program. 
 
                                                 
10 Government Bill 1991/92:100. 
11 Government Bill 1992/93:100, Annex 1, p. 1. 
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balance by 1998 and central government debt as a proportion of GDP to be stabilized by 
1996.
12 It was moreover stated that the deficit in the public sector should not exceed 3 percent 
of GDP in 1997, which was one of the criteria for entry into the European Union’s monetary 
union. The objective of stabilizing central government debt by 1996 was achieved. Central 
government debt peaked at 81 per cent of GDP in 1995 and was thereafter successively 
reduced. The consolidation of public finances laid the basis for a credible low inflation policy 
with a monetary policy that could be carried out in an expansive direction without price and 
wage increases accelerating. 
 
In 1997, a new budget act came into effect. Its main characteristic is what is called an 
expenditure limit decision model. This means that the Riksdag makes decisions on the budget 
in two steps. In the first step, the Riksdag sets the overall budget space and distributes this to 
individual expenditure areas. The Riksdag also establishes an estimate of revenue in the 
budget. The limits set for the respective expenditure area in the first step thereby forms a 
binding restriction. After consideration by its various committees, the Riksdag makes the final 
decision on the various appropriations. All appropriations within an expenditure area are 
distributed in a single decision. From having one of the weakest budget processes in Europe, 
the new set up resulted in Sweden having a considerably more stringent budget process, well 
on a par with comparable European countries.
13  
 
In addition to the new budget act, a long-term surplus target was established. The government 
decided that the general government financial balance should have a surplus amounting to 2 
percent of GDP on average over a business cycle. The government had a number of motives 
for this surplus target: 
 
-  Public finances will be exposed to considerable pressure some way into the 21
st 
century, not least because of the increasing number of elderly people. The surplus 
target plays an important role for equipping the public sector to meet this 
development. 
 
-  The prospects for pursuing a cyclical policy were improving. With a surplus of 2 
percent of GDP as a starting point, there was a margin for actively counteracting 
cyclical slowdowns without the deficit in public finances threatening to become too 
large. 
 
-  A surplus in public finances promotes and makes possible high private investments 
without Sweden’s foreign debt increasing. 
 
The basis is that a 2 percent surplus should be achieved when the use of resources in the 
Swedish economy is at a level that is possible to maintain without accelerating inflation. In a 
downturn, the surplus should consequently be less than 2 percent and in an upswing more 
than 2 percent. 
 
In 1999, the new monetary policy regime based on an explicit inflation target and a floating 
exchange rate received legal backing, as it was written into the Riksbank Act. Since then, the 
Riksbank has the statutory target of maintaining price stability. In addition, the Riksbank has 
an obligation to support general economic policy, promoting sustainable growth and high 
                                                 
12 Government Bill 1994/95: 150. 
13 Central government debt and the budget process , Government report Ds 1992:16. 
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new legislation, it was clarified that the Riksbank may not accept instructions from outside on 
the conduct of monetary policy. The obligation of the Riksbank to consult with the parliament 
before taking important monetary policy decisions was thus changed to a duty to inform. In 
the sphere of foreign exchange policy, the new legislation meant that responsibility for overall 
foreign exchange policy issues was transferred from the Riksbank to the government. The 
Riksbank on the other hand decides on the practical application of foreign exchange policy in 
a system with a floating exchange rate. 
 
In all, these institutional reforms have meant that the economic playing field in Sweden has 
changed dramatically in the last two decades. In the past, households and firms operated in a 
heavily regulated environment with government controlled interest rates and a fixed exchange 
rate; today, they act in a liberalized and internationalized environment where decisions are 
based on prices that are freely determined in the market place. Consequently, resource 
allocation is more efficient than before the 1980s. In addition, fiscal policy is on a 
substantially firmer footing thanks to a more rigorous framework in which Sweden’s 
historical tendency for fiscal deficits has been mitigated. Monetary policy has been 
substantially transformed, shifting from a fixed exchange rate regime to an inflation targeting 
regime. 
 
One important result of these institutional changes is that issues related to macroeconomic 
stabilization require less policy attention than some decades ago. Instead, the focus in the 
policy debate has largely shifted to two other areas. On the hand, there is a lively discussion 
about the determinants of growth and innovation; on the other hand, the nature and 
sustainability of the welfare state has a more prominent position on the policy agenda. It is 
possible that this shift in policy priorities is at least a partial explanation for the improving 
performance of the Swedish economy. In the 1970s and 1980s, when all attention was 
required to achieve macroeconomic stability, questions related to long term growth and 
sustainability were arguably neglected. As a result, Sweden lost positions in the international 
incomes league, falling from third or fourth in the early 1970s to somewhere around 20
th 
position in the early 1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the economy has recovered and Sweden is 
again a position in the top-10.   
 
4. Concluding comments 
 
While the main priorities in Vietnamese macroeconomic management have arguably 
remained the same throughout the past two decades – high growth and reasonable stability – it 
is clear that it has become increasingly difficult to reach these objectives. On the one hand, 
new problems and new policy challenges have emerged in the course of the country’s 
development and internationalization. In the mid-1990s, economic structure and external 
balance emerged on the policy agenda. In the late 1990s, new problems were created by the 
Asian crisis. In recent years, issues related to social and regional development gaps and 
investment quality have become important policy objectives. At the same time, growth and 
stability remain core priorities, which means that the equation to be solved by policy makers 
is increasingly complex. On the other hand, it is clear that the instruments for economic policy 
making have changed. While the challenges in the early 1990s could be handled with various 
direct interventions, like credit ceilings and quantitative trade restrictions, there is less room 
for such interventions in today’s more internationalized policy environment. For instance, 
Vietnam’s various trade agreements, including the WTO in the near future, restrict the scope 
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interest rates are increasingly determined by the market rather than by government officials. 
Instead, the policy focus is shifting to creating and overseeing the institutions that determine 
the behavior of the market. Rules and incentives are becoming more important than direct 
interventions, and when interventions do occur, they are typically executed through the 
market, e.g. in the form of open market operations. One consequence is that the choice of 
exchange rate regime is becoming a much more important decision than in the past.  
 
It is difficult to foresee the next stage of development in the Vietnamese macroeconomy, but 
some of the challenges are easy to foresee. External balance and international competitiveness 
are definitely two areas that will figure prominently in the Vietnamese macroeconomic 
balancing equation in the future. In this paper, we have illustrated some of the alternative 
approaches to macroeconomic management in an increasingly internationalized and 
deregulated environment by recounting some experiences from Swedish macroeconomic 
management during the past three decades. Although Sweden and Vietnam differ in many 
respects, they are both relatively small open economies that are highly dependent on 
international trade and other kinds of international contacts. Like Vietnam, Sweden has also 
undergone a dramatic internationalization during the past decades. In the Swedish case, this 
process involved not only increased imports and export, but perhaps mainly an 
internationalization of the financial market, with substantial consequences for macroeconomic 
management. A similar development is not unlikely for Vietnam. With increasingly open 
markets and a rapidly growing trade share, it will be difficult for Vietnam to maintain strict 
controls in the financial market. In a more internationalized economy, the actors will 
gradually find ways to bypass those controls that are contrary to their interest: at that stage, at 
the latest, it will be in the interest of authorities to adjust the formal rules to what is already a 
reality.  
 
The Swedish experiences of this adjustment process suggest that there are many pitfalls in the 
liberalization and internationalization process. A first lesson concerns the liberalization of the 
financial sector, and has been emphasized also in connection with the Asian crisis. In Sweden, 
the deregulation of credit markets took place before sufficient formal financial surveillance by 
government was in place. In the early stages of deregulation, this meant that banks and other 
financial institutions took on excessive risk. With limited experience of how to compete in a 
liberalized financial market, and with weak skills regarding risk management, the individual 
actors were lured to focus more on credit volumes and market shares than on the quality of 
their credit portfolios.  
 
A second lesson concerns the instruments for macroeconomic stabilization. The Swedish 
experience demonstrates clearly how external and internal balance rests on fiscal policy under 
a fixed exchange rate. When fiscal policy is too expansive – i.e. when economic growth is a 
policy priority that cannot be compromised – the likely result is internal overheating and high 
inflation, risking real appreciation of the exchange rate. In such a situation, there is a risk that 
continuous current account deficits are financed by increased borrowing in foreign currency, 
since the overheated domestic market will result in high real interest rates. If so, short term 
foreign capital may finance domestic investment, with creates severe dependence on foreign 
creditors. The situation is particularly sensitive if the banking sector finances itself abroad to 
invest domestically.  
 
The current account deficits can be remedied in the short run through a devaluation of the 
currency, but there are several risks connected to this. One problem is related to the foreign 
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exchange rate is devalued, the burden of foreign debt will increase. This is a particularly 
severe problem if the banking sector holds substantial foreign debt: the increasing debt burden 
may result in financial instability and serious credit restrictions when banks adjust to their 
higher debt. Another problem has to do with expectations. Firms and households may learn to 
expect regular devaluations, and may adjust their behavior to these expectations. One 
consequence is high inflation expectations, since the devaluation will restore external balance 
even if domestic price increases are higher than those in the rest of the world. A more serious 
consequence may be the expectation that long term growth strategies are unnecessary if 
regular devaluations are available as a response to competitiveness problems. 
 
With a floating exchange rate, it may be possible to resolve some of these concerns. In 
particular, there is a stronger potential for efficient monetary policy, although it should be 
noted that a strong institutional environment is required to create a credible policy 
environment. In the Swedish cases, this has required an independent Riksbank with very 
substantial autonomy and a clear mandate to maintain price stability. At present, Vietnam 
lacks both the monetary policy tools and the State Bank independence to follow this example. 
 
A third lesson concerns the character of economic policy in different institutional settings. It 
is clear that Swedish policy makers paid much attention to stabilization issues during the 
transition from the fixed exchange rate regime in the 1970s and 1980s to the present setup. 
This meant that long term growth and innovation issues and discussions about the 
sustainability of the welfare state were less prominent. To some extent, the ambitions in these 
policy areas were instead adjusted to the current macroeconomic conditions. In times of 
relative stability, the welfare state was more generous; in times of turbulence, welfare benefits 
had to be reduced. The present macroeconomic regime is to a large extent an 
institutionalization of policy that is likely to remain successful as long as the credibility of the 
Riksbank is maintained, and as long as there is no obvious conflict between the price stability 
requirements and real variables, such as employment and income growth. This setup has 
allowed policy makers to focus their attention on long term issues like growth and welfare. 
The result has arguably been an improvement in the Swedish policy environment, reflected 
e.g. in improved economic performance. In Vietnam, policy makers have been able to focus 
much on growth and related long term issues thanks to the reasonably stable macroeconomic 
environment since the early 1990s. The internationalization of the Vietnamese economy is 
likely to require a regime shift in macroeconomic management. This transition from a strictly 
controlled environment to a more market-based regime will probably be accompanied by 
increasing instability: a period of trials and errors is likely when Vietnam searches for a model 
that is suited to the specific features of the economy. While this process will require the 
attention of Vietnam’s policy makers, it is important that it does not divert attention from the 
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